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The Law Schools and the New Pro- 
fession of Social Technician 
By FREDERICK K. BEUTEL 
RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN considerable discussion of the 
fact that there is emerging all over the world a new profes- 
sion of management of both private and public business. 
These persons neither own the business which they operate 
nor win the elections to public office. Nevertheless, they 
are increasingly taking over the control of the operation of 
our social machinery because it is too complicated to be run 
by amateurs, whether they be stockholders or voters.' 
In the past much of this technical work of managing com- 
plicated social affairs has been done by legally trained per- 
sonnel, and there are those who still believe that the law 
schools have the key for entrance into this new profession. 
Others feel that the present legal training is wholly beside the 
point and can offer nothing of value toward the development 
of this new profession. 
It might be worthwhile to examine briefly the qualifica- 
tions of our American law schools as centers for training the 
newly emerging profession of managers, or social technicians. 
What the Law Schools Are Doing Now 
AT THE PRESENT TIME our legal education, concerned almost 
entirely with court decisions, is doing little more than drill 
the students intensively in the technique of trying cases.2 
With attention in instruction directed almost entirely toward 
prosecution of private litigation, the great body of the cur- 
1 Cf. James Burnham, "The Managerial Revolution," New York, 1941. 
2 Karl N. Llewellyn, "On What Is Wrong with So-called Legal Education," 193 5 
35 Col. L. Rev., p. 651; Riesman, "Law and Social Science," 1941, 50 Yale L. Jour., 
p. 636. 
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riculum is made up of cases decided in the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury in suits between individual business men. The field of 
public law, insofar as it is studied, is relegated to an exami- 
nation of judicial veto of government action, based on some 
sort of idea that the government operates outside the legal 
system. It is significant that there is not a single school in 
America devoted exclusively or even to a preponderant de- 
gree to training public lawyers for the practice of law either 
as public servants or as specialists opposing the government. 
In fact, law students can and do graduate from leading insti- 
tutions like Harvard Law School without taking a single 
course in public law,3 and it should be said that the Harvard 
Law School is not much more backward in this respect than 
the others, which have copied its curriculum to such a degree 
that the field of public law plays a very minor role in the 
great majority of schools. This state of the curriculum, 
badly out of line with the actual legal as well as the social 
condition of the nation where the government now inter- 
feres with almost every aspect of life, is simply an historic 
accident, based on the case method. It cannot be corrected, 
either for the purpose of training in the art of social control 
or even for the simple end of preparing students to "practice 
law" as we now understand it, by the expedient of adding 
another year to the curriculum.4 The difficulty lies in our 
theories of the nature of law and our method of study. 
The Case Method 
THE CASE METHOD, which is the touchstone of our system, 
needs re-examination even when used merely as a basis for a 
training to enter the narrower field of practice of law. 
3 See 27 Official Register of Harvard University, The Law School, 1940, No. 29, 
p. 22. Criminal law, sometimes classed as a public law course, is required in the first 
year for two hours, one semester, ibid., p. 9. 
4Merrill, 1939, Handbook of Association of American Law Schools, p. 97; and for 
a bibliography on the subject see Association of American Law Schools Program, 1939. 
pp. 36, 47-50. 
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Our law schools and law curricula have been built up 
around "the common law" which is a well-known assump- 
tion that law consists of a rationalization of the decided cases 
of Anglo-American courts. In a primitive society such as 
existed in the Early Roman Empire, in Fourteenth Century 
England, or in the frontier society of this country in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century where there was little 
or no written law, the judges' decision of a case was the best 
and almost only evidence upon which one could rely in de- 
termining the meaning of law. Therefore, the decided case, 
based on the written opinion, was the source material out of 
which the jurist or lawyer could fashion a set of laws for 
advising clients and winning future cases. The primitive 
condition of legislation and public records made the reported 
case about all the evidence there was for one desiring to study 
the mechanism of social control by law. 
Langdell, late in the Nineteenth Century, re-vitalized this 
process and began what we have been pleased to call the scien- 
tific study of cases. But it is an interesting commentary on 
the development of culture that as soon as social phenomena 
are recognized and named, they have often run their course 
of usefulness and are already being replaced by other social 
devices. Just as the schools, under the leadership of Lang- 
dell, began to study the cases, society and the legal order em- 
barked upon a tremendous development of legislative and 
administrative rules. This was followed shortly afterward 
by a complete rewriting of the common law in the form of a 
restatement which may supersede the unwritten law where 
it is still pertinent. The power to settle social disputes, the 
prevention of future activities against the public order and 
the authoritative interpretation of law began to pass from 
the judicial to the executive and legislative branches of the 
government. About all that remained to the judicial branch 
in the field of adjustment of social interests by government 
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action was a veto power that received a staggering blow in 
the court-packing fight of 1937. 
In view of our present legal theories and sanctions, the old 
common law methods amount to little more than spreading 
superstition and encouraging a technique for settling pri- 
vate controversies, a technique that is often entirely irrele- 
vant to the issues and wholly at odds with the demands of 
social justice.5 But the study of cases and the development 
of the case method are intriguing operations which have been 
developed far beyond their usefulness as a method of social 
control or as a device for scientific research. The emphasis 
on cases has been so completely overweighted that one would 
have no difficulty in finding honor students of the law and 
many teachers in the law faculties who would defend the 
ridiculous proposition that "legislation is meaningless with- 
out a court decision interpreting it." 
In fact, the concentrated study of the cases has often 
caused us to conceive a "common law" where none ever ex- 
isted or where it has long since ceased to have any appreciable 
place in the legal order. Even in the field of private law, we 
talk, for example, about the common law of negotiable in- 
struments, sales, insurance, or corporations, or even property, 
when as a matter of fact in the first-named subject there 
never was any common law6 and, in most of the others, the 
basic concepts used today are to be found in ancient or 
modern statutes and codes.7 
Turning to public law, this distortion is even more serious. 
In the United States, at least, it is silly to talk about public 
common law when it is a well-known fact that our public 
5 For a further discussion of this point see, F. K. Beutel, "Some Implications of 
Experimental Jurisprudence," 1934, 43 Har. L. Rev., pp. 169, 180 ff. 
1 F. K. Beutel, "The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law," 
1938, 51 Har. L. Rev., p. 813; ibid., "The Development of Statutes on Negotiable Paper," 
1940, 40 Col. L. Rev., pp. 836, 865. 
7 For some of the older statutory starting points see, James L. Landis, "Statutes and 
the Sources of Law," Harvard Legal Essays, 1934, p. 213. The uniform laws and modern 
statutes in the subjects named are too well known to require citation. 
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law is based directly upon the interpretation and adminis- 
tration of written constitutions and statutes drawn there- 
under. The blind following of precedents has caused our 
Supreme Court in many cases to wander so far afield from 
the written text of the Constitution that it has been forced 
by the requirement of popular pressure to reverse its deci- 
sions and return again to concepts within the document and 
more in accord with social needs.8 But our law schools, to 
date, have not yielded. So great has been the over-emphasis 
of the case that many of the leaders of the American Bar 
Association seem to be convinced that litigation is the only 
safe means of adjusting social interests. The now happily 
defunct Logan-Walter Bill is a striking commentary on the 
extent to which this mistaken idea has gained acceptance not 
only among the Bar but even in the Congress of the United 
States, where there is a widely-held view that all of the work 
of the administrative bodies of the government could be 
handled by litigation. Fortunately, the President, who, per- 
haps, was not so thoroughly grounded in the case method as 
were some of the proponents of the bill, knew better.9 
A still more serious difficulty with the case method in the 
study of law, as a means for developing a sound basis for sci- 
entific social control, is the fact that, even in such simple 
matters as keeping the peace, there is no correlation between 
the point of view of the courts as evidenced in the decision 
8 See Mr. Justice Holmes' cryptic dissent on this point, Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 
U. S. 586, 595, which will be recognized as the basis for a long line of cases reversing 
the policy of the court, beginning with National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Charles C. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 
548; and for examples of others see, United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S. Ct. 451 
(1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 
525 (1923); and see the reversal of the application of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's dic- 
tum as often phrased, "The power to tax is the power to destroy," McCulloch v. Mary- 
land, 4 Wheaton 316, 431 (1819); in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 
(1937); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 
466 (1939); O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939); but cf. Pittman v. Home 
Owners Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21 (1939). Any student of constitutional law can sug- 
gest many others. 
9 27 Am. Bar Assn. Jour., 1941, p. 52. 
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of cases and the necessary requirements for social regulation. 
As indicated elsewhere,'0 the courts deal only with aggra- 
vated cases of social maladjustment where the law has failed 
properly to balance the conflicting interests of the parties. 
The cases are all decided ex post facto and long after the 
results of the maladjustment have run their course. Using 
the case as a method for finding law that can act as a form of 
social regulation is, therefore, not only subject to the fallacy 
of arguing from the particular to the general, but also to the 
glaring defect that, since proper adjustment of interests 
would eliminate litigation, the method by which the litiga- 
tion is settled usually offers no clues to the prevention of liti- 
gation in future cases." 
Every field of law is full of illustrations of how the acci- 
dental decision of a case has become the beginning of a long 
line of authority which created a rule of law wholly out of 
line with social conditions, and totally unable to offer any 
solution of similar problems in a changing society.'2 It is 
small wonder that a search for certainty in a field of legal 
thought based so completely on the accidental presence of 
cases in courts of law has led to the school of gastronomical 
jurisprudence, which would solve the problems of social ad- 
justment by examining the judge's breakfast before he goes on 
the bench. Still this approach is no more ridiculous in our 
present state of legal development than is the process of de- 
10 See supra, note 5. 
11 For example, the problem of traffic accidents has been best solved by stop light, 
by-passes, traffic circles, and express highways; the industrial accident cases by safety 
devices and workman's compensation; criminal cases may be reduced by play grounds, 
recreation, and the like; illegal sale of liquor by state stores, see Shipman, "State Adminis- 
trative Machinery for Liquor Control," 1940, Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 600, 
611 ff. In these and many other similar instances, generalizations from court decisions 
could offer no clue to the successful solution. 
12 For example: the fellow servant rule; Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (1704), holding 
promissory notes non-negotiable, in negotiable paper; the doctrine of Livingston v. Jeffer- 
son, 1 Broc. Fed Cases, No. 8411 (1811) that suits for actions of trespass to real estate 
are local actions, American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of Laws 614, and for 
the manner in which the weight of precedent prevails over common sense in such matters 
see, 7 Proceedings of the American Law Institute, 1929, pp. 86-9. Any teacher of law 
can add numerous other examples from his own courses. 
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riving standards of social control from isolated litigated cases, 
a process that now forms the basis for courses of study in our 
leading law schools. 
Judicial Philosophy as a Basis of Social Control 
EVEN W SOME CERTAINTY could be established by the elimi- 
nation of the isolated case and a substitution of statistical 
study of court decisions, which is not the basis of the present 
case method technique, judicial philosophy is a bad founda- 
tion for a legal system, or for a course of instruction in the 
administration of social justice. The roots of the judges' 
social philosophy lie in isolation, class consciousness, conser- 
vatism, and even reaction.'3 The best the judge can offer in 
the way of social philosophy is usually the material that he 
studied when he was in school, which was nearly thirty years 
prior to the time of the judicial decision he is rendering. 
'When the case in turn becomes the basis of the legal philoso- 
phy of the succeeding generation of courts and lawyers, legal 
thinking tends to move in a closing spiral, turning constantly 
in on itself in an orbit entirely out of touch with society and 
social needs." With our rules of evidence and our court pro- 
13 The idea that the courts are the bulwarks of liberty and the defenders of the 
common man has been neatly exploded by Edgerton, "The Incidence of Judicial Control 
over Congress," 1937, 22 Cor. L. Q., p. 299. 
14 Even so liberal-minded a judge as Mr. Justice Holmes was not free from this type 
of thinking. See the horse and buggy standard for negligence of a driver of a truck, in 
the face of a verdict, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 
66, 70 (1927). In spite of the fact that the decision of Mr. Justice Holmes, supra, was 
so out of line with social conditions that it excited a storm of protest and law review 
comment (see Index to Legal Periodicals, Jan. 1926-Sept. 1928, p. 667), mostly unfavor- 
able, a glance at Shepard's Citations will show that this dictum became the basis of one 
Supreme Court decision and thirty-three decisions in the Circuit Courts of Appeal, either 
denying the injured plaintiff the right to go to the jury or depriving him of a verdict 
after the lower court had allowed the case to go to the jury. These lower court decisions 
not only following but extending the stop, look, and listen doctrine make interesting 
reading to one who would like to see "what a d- d fool a man has to make himself in 
order to conform to the decisions of the Supreme Court," 22 Ill. L. Rev., pp. 800-1. 
They are only a part of the many hundreds of other cases which have extended this 
foolish dictum all through the lower federal and state courts to refuse recovery in daily 
accidents to an injured plaintiff under facts where a sound social policy would cover the 
whole matter with insurance. It should be noted, however, that this outrageous doc- 
trine only lasted seven years, when it was abolished by Mr. Justice Cardozo, one of our 
most socially-alert judges (in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 98, pp. 104-6). 
If time and space permitted, similar anachronisms could be produced at random from 
any field of law which are still flourishing. 
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cedure such as they are, the judge tends more and more to 
operate in the rarefied atmosphere of a system carefully insu- 
lated from social control. It is small wonder, then, that a 
large number of the social changes that were ordered by 
statutes or regulations (we avoid, to limit controversy, indi- 
cating whether we think they are progressive or decadent) 
were declared unconstitutional when they were challenged in 
the courts during the last century because they were found 
by the judges to be "'unprecedented."'5 
When the judicial decision becomes the basis of the study 
of law, as it has been in America during the last thirty years, 
it is not surprising that legal processes are of so little use in 
solving social problems. The continued study of law on this 
basis cannot meet the requirements of the new age of chang- 
ing legal activity which is now upon us and will come even 
faster in the cleaning up of the debris of the present war. It 
is necessary to begin now, while our schools are being deci- 
mated to provide manpower for the military machine, to lay 
the foundation of courses which will offer scientific guidance 
to those who will return to pick up the loose ends of our shat- 
tered social system when peace finally comes. 
Whether the law schools enter whole-heartedly into the 
task of developing their graduates to fill all the various re- 
quirements of the new profession of technicians in social 
15 For example, see Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' conclusion in Schechter Corp. et al. 
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 541 (1935); and note how the expert commission, partly 
because it is new, cannot be constitutionally entrusted with finding the fact of value in 
rate cases, see Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Ohio Valley 
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); but a common law jury, largely 
because it is old, is held entirely competent to pass upon such technical facts, United Gas 
Public Service Co. v. State of Texas, 303 U. S. 123 (1938). See also Brown, "Due 
Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court," 1927, 40 Har. L. Rev., p. 943, 
where the author points out that between 1921 and 1927 31 percent of all the decisions 
in Due Process cases were against the constitutionality of statutes. It should be noted 
that this was at a time when the governments of the country were, on the whole, in the 
hands of the conservatives. A similar percentage would undoubtedly appear from 1927- 
1937 when the liberals were in power. It may also be coincidence that the increase in 
the percentage of cases declared unconstitutional corresponds with the appearance in the 
courts of lawyers trained by the case method. The more liberal attitude during the last 
five years is accounted for by the systematic effort of the Federal administration to place 
the few progressively-minded lawyers available in judicial positions. 
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control, or merely continue to train a decreasing segment of 
this profession, they must re-examine the basic legal postu- 
lates and the method whereby we seek them. 
The Sources of Basic Legal Postulates 
WHAT, THEN, IS THE BASIS for determining legal postulates? 
If the cases and the traditional common law methods will not 
suffice as the foundation on which to build even an adequate 
system of "legal education," where are the law schools to 
turn for the basic information necessary to provide sound 
training for their students, either as "lawyers" or social 
technicians? 
History has offered many starting points for legal systems. 
Among these have been the will of the conqueror, the arbi- 
trary edicts of dictators, the mysticism of divine will with its 
closely related source, the canons of the priesthood, and the 
desires of a ruling class. One needs only casual familiarity 
with legal history to see that the failure of these sources to 
provide any adequate system of social regulation has been 
demonstrated beyond doubt. In addition to the dicta of the 
judiciary, which has already been disposed of as a proper 
source of law and postulates of social justice, there remain 
only three other sources which have been recognized in the 
past. These are received ideas of law which are held by the 
professional administrators of the law itself, namely the bar; 
the writings of legal scholars, who are always closely con- 
nected with the bar and the courts; and lastly the democratic 
will of the people as expressed by popular legislation. 
Recent experience with legislation and ideas of justice 
recommended by the American Bar Association has demon- 
strated that, in this country at least, where the members of 
the bar are a group of entrepreneurs deriving their livelihood 
and profit almost wholly from money fees, and relying as 
they do upon the favor of the courts for their prosperity, the 
102 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 
professional lawyers are unable to look at the problems of 
social adjustment with that clear, unbiased, detached point 
of view necessary for the formulation of any practicable 
system of social justice. 
Although the leading legal writers in the past have offered 
many suggestions for improvement in the machinery of jus- 
tice, they have unfortunately been so saturated with the 
common law technique and have become so blinded by the 
process of collecting and tabulating cases that they lack both 
the social information and the perspective successfully to 
project a well-rounded legal system which could hope to deal 
with the complicated problem of achieving social justice. 
This brings us to the last historical source of legal axioms 
which at one time or another in the history of the world has 
been regarded as the basis for ultimate solution of the prob- 
lem, the will of the Demos or the systematized expression of 
their will by elected representatives in the form of statutes 
and codes. Although it may be bad politics at a time when 
we have an interest in a bloody conflict in its alleged defense, 
careful scientific method requires the questioning of the 
democratic will as a basis for a successful legal system. As- 
suming the democratic standard, that law and social control 
should achieve the good of the greatest number, there has 
been a belief that the people somehow, by collective action, 
could devise the basis upon which a system to achieve this 
good could be built. The idea is, of course, founded upon 
two propositions. The first is the Eighteenth Century be- 
lief in enlightened selfishness; that is, that the common man 
in satisfying his wants will demand those things which work 
for his own good in the long run and that the sum of indi- 
vidual good would add up to the greatest collective good. 
The second is the Jeffersonian dictum, "The people are always 
right in the end; they may make mistakes, but they them- 
selves rectify them." 
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The idea of enlightened selfishness attaining the collective 
good was predicated upon a simple society where each per- 
son could see and understand the results of his actions both 
upon himself and society. Although this may have been 
the case in the time of John Stuart Mill, it is no longer pos- 
sible today. The complication of the modern social struc- 
ture is such that no single individual can pass intelligent judg- 
ment on the result of his actions upon himself or upon the 
whole of society. The individual is accustomed to take ex- 
pert advice on comparatively simple matters pertaining to 
health, repair of machinery, investment, construction of 
houses, education, and the like. Why, then, should he ex- 
pect to be able to know the answers in the most complicated 
of all activities, the regulation of society? The fate of France 
is the best illustration of the working of the doctrine of en- 
lightened selfishness in the Twentieth Century. 
The second assumption is that the collective populace are 
able, somehow, to reach the truth about public affairs. This 
is also out of line with the facts of modern society. 
Unfortunately Jefferson did not have the benefit of mod- 
ern psychology which shows that more than 40 percent of 
the people lack sufficient intelligence to get through an 
ordinary course in high school. Of the remaining 60 per- 
cent who perhaps can complete their secondary education, 
less than one-third have the ability to do college work, and 
only one-third of these college students can take up profes- 
sional study, where about 50 percent fail before graduation.16 
Putting it another way, about one in five can even hope to 
go to college, and less than one in ten have sufficient capacity 
possibly to grasp the ramifications of the problems of govern- 
16 See Garrett and Schneck, "Psychological Tests, Methods and Results," 1933, Part II, 
pp. 26-39, where the author correlates the Stanford-Binet tests with the results of the 
Army Alpha and many other studies. The Army Alpha showed that less than 5 percent 
of the population has the capacity for work on a high professional level. See also Bell, 
"Youth Tell Their Story," 1938, pp. 51, 96; and Terman, "The Intelligence of School 
Children," 1919, p. 89. 
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ing a country such as ours.'7 In the light of these facts, it 
is pure nonsense to expect that any democratic will made up 
of the majority of feeling, votes, or approved ideas or ideals 
of an entire unselected population could possibly offer a 
working basis for regulating and adjusting the myriad clashes 
of interests which occur in a society complicated beyond the 
most prophetic dreams of Jefferson, Lincoln, or their asso- 
ciates. The common man in modern society is scarcely ca- 
able of determining what are his own interests and of taking 
intelligent steps to protect them, to say nothing of solving 
the problems of social adjustment for nations made up of 
millions of individuals with their myriad wants, ambitions, 
desires, and expectations. It is pure mysticism to believe 
that the collective judgment of a group who cannot indi- 
vidually understand the problem at hand can offer any real 
basis for its solution. 
If any working system of social control in modern society 
is to grow out of the democratic principle of the greatest 
good for the greatest number, it must be predicated upon the 
scientific study by experts, drawn from the upper 1 0 percent 
of the intelligence level of the population. The work of this 
group should be to determine, first, the needs of the people in 
17 It is interesting to note that our high schools have already enrolled the capacity 
of the youth able, according to these figures, to do their work; 54 percent of the popula- 
tion of high school age were enrolled in 1930 and about 67 percent in 1936, "Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States," Government Printing Office, Washington, 1939, p. 108. 
In like manner the colleges are reaching their capacity with over 924,000 enrolled in 
1930, 1,000,000 in 1936 and 1,200,000 in 1939, ibid., p. 110, p. 117, and "World 
Almanac," World-Telegram, New York, 1941, p. 551. This number constituted a little 
more than 10 percent of the people of college age in America, "Fifteenth Census of 
United States," Part II, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933, p. 576. The 
census figures of 1930 show about 21.4 percent of people between 18 and 20 years old 
were in school, ibid., p. 1091, while much less than one-fifth of those between 16 and 
24 years were in school. Of those who finish high school less than 300 in 1000 have 
the ability to go to college while only 105 out of 1000 with such ability have actually 
matriculated, Bell, op. cit., p. 96. This means that our colleges and professional schools 
are failing to reach over half of the population with the mental ability to do their work, 
while they are taking in large numbers who are financially able but without the mental 
capacity to handle college training. It is small wonder then, that less than half of those 
who undertake this work ever receive their final degrees, "Statistical Abstract," op. cit., 
p. 110. This appalling waste of our greatest natural resource, native intelligence, is a 
problem for government administrators and all educators, legal and otherwise. 
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society, and second, the means of creating effectively legal 
machinery which will make possible the satisfaction of those 
needs. What the common man cannot do for himself must 
be done by scientists acting as his servants, otherwise democ- 
racy will become either blind groping in the dark or a shib- 
boleth used to drive the common men to do the will and serve 
the purposes of others under the guise that he is somehow 
helping himself. This seems to be the state in which most 
of our social systems now find themselves after long experi- 
ments with government by popular vote. (It should not 
be forgotten that Hitler came to power in Germany by using 
democratic forms.) 
Of course, there is always the possibility that we may have 
accidentally hit upon a legal system adequate to our social 
needs, without any guiding philosophy. It is interesting to 
note, in this respect, that the civilization in which our found- 
ing fathers lived and from which they rationalized in creat- 
ing our present legal system, was much closer to the year 1 
A.D. in all of its attributes than our present civilization is to 
theirs.'8 The industrial revolution and all of the inventions 
which have abolished day and night, distance and time, which 
have changed the face of the earth as to make it possible for 
thousands of men to live in comparative comfort where be- 
fore a few could exist in the most primitive squalor, have 
made our systems of law and government as antiquated a tool 
for social control as the stage coach as a means of transporta- 
tion. 
Just as it was impossible for the founding fathers to fore- 
see the strain which would be put upon their governmental 
system, so also we are likely to find that old rules of law, ex- 
cept insofar as we can show scientifically that they can serve 
their purposes in their new surroundings, are useless for 
18 Robert S. Lynd, "Middletown-A Study in Contemporary American Culture," 
New York, 1929. 
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guidance in solving our modern problems. The doctrine of 
Stare Decisis and the laws of the Medes and Persians which 
changeth not cannot be long expected to regulate a society 
so dynamic that the latest airplane is antiquated before it can 
be taken off the assembly line. We must admit that juridical 
theories of the social and legal structure, no matter how per- 
fect they may appear in the light of logic or on the basis of 
legal theory, are wholly useless unless they can solve success- 
fully the simplest of all legal problems; namely, keeping the 
peace at home and abroad. Even our most widely heralded 
legal devices have failed to meet this most elementary test, 
to say nothing of the larger problem now being posed: the 
duty, somehow, of seeing that every man gets an economic 
square deal. 
The new age of activity which is now upon us will demand 
a new type of legal-social craftsman who can rebuild the 
legal structure to meet the needs of today and tomorrow 
through a process of orderly change which will preserve to 
society and the deserving people in it the technical gains of 
the last century. This is the most gigantic task yet to chal- 
lenge the intelligence of man. The penalty of failure will 
be to turn our modern mechanical power, chemistry, bac- 
teriology, and all of the material of science over to a govern- 
mental intelligence which has learned little since the days of 
Rome. In the hands of such a government we may expect 
modern technology not only to wreck the social order, but 
eventually to destroy itself. 
A New Social Science as a Basis for Legal Postulates 
As HAS BEEN INDICATED elsewhere,19 there is rapidly emerg- 
ing on all sides evidence that there are now available sufficient 
facts upon which there can be built a new science of human 
conduct comparable with the physical sciences both in the ac- 
19 See supra, note 8. 
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curacy of its data and in predictability of future happenings 
when applied to the mass actions of men. Scientific laws of 
human behavior, and the ability to apply them in devising 
man-made laws for the control of society, are now becoming 
a dominating force in the world. No thinking person can 
view the rise of the Third Reich or the developments in Soviet 
Russia without realizing that they are awesome examples of 
the use that can be made of such new social sciences to rebuild 
society on lines never before conceived. The men who 
wield these new forces, directing them to such purposes as 
they will, have been able to make the whole world tremble. 
Under the impact of intelligently, or fiendishly if you will, 
directed social planning, laissez faire is dead in the economic 
world and rapidly disappearing in the political and legal 
spheres. Pressure groups, economic cartels, propaganda, and 
outright gang methods directed toward scientifically pre- 
dictable ends are at large both at home and abroad. We have 
witnessed nation after nation torn asunder by these forces 
directed from within or without by men who understood 
their use and who have turned them to their ends. We may 
even now be in the process of seeing our own civilization 
destroyed, our own people becoming the slaves of foreign 
purposes, and perhaps being led to their own destruction 
through the unbridled operation of skillful economic blocs, 
propagandists, and pressure groups. 
The American public administrator of today and tomor- 
row must understand the use of these forces and be able to 
devise laws to control them in the interest of what we are 
now pleased to call the democratic good. 
One illustration will suffice to show the myriad problems 
which must be solved. In the most sacred field of the bill of 
rights, freedom of expression and action it may not be suf- 
ficient to keep the avenues of expression and trade open to 
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all, or even to attempt to see that all views have an equal 
opportunity for exposition or all intellectual wares be ac- 
corded an open market. Perhaps there will have to be an 
intelligent evaluation of the power of ideas which are at large 
in society, in a manner similar to that in which we now 
evaluate food products. It may be that poison ideas are more 
dangerous than poison foods if placed in the minds of the 
wrong people. It seems as possible to make experiments on 
what 'goods' should be offered in the intellectual market as 
it is to determine what should become available for the sus- 
tenance of the "inner man." Freedom of speech, thought 
and activity may have wholly disappeared in large parts of 
the world, because some of the population cannot stand the 
impact of certain ideas. If nervous breakdowns can be in- 
duced in men and animals by the overcomplication of life,20 
why cannot social breakdowns be produced by over-compli- 
cation of ideas? Is not this the principle upon which the 
dictators have operated to destroy the morale of enemy coun- 
tries? May it not be that freedom of expression, thought, 
and action is the birthright only of the intelligent few, and 
is it not possible that we have at hand the means of deter- 
mining who these few are, and how this principle can be 
applied to even "democratic" government? 
The government administrator, or technician, who devises 
the social and legal rules for the state of tomorrow can hardly 
escape the task of finding answers for these and many more 
complicated problems. To assume that we now know the 
answers is to act on blind prejudice and in the face of obvious 
evidence to the contrary which appears on all sides. 
Governments of the future, whether they be despotisms 
or democracies, can no longer rely solely upon the will of 
20 Hilgard and Marquis, "Conditioning and Learning," 1940, pp. 280-287; Cook, "A 
Survey of Methods Used to Produce Experimental Neurosis," 95 Am. J. Psychiat., pp. 
1259-76; Maier, "Studies of Abnormal Behavior in the Rat," 1939. Also see "Grew- 
some Tales for Children," Time (Feb. 17, 1941), p. 39; "Propaganda Study Used Suc- 
cessfully by 3,000 Schools," N. Y. Times (Feb. 21, 1941), p. 1. 
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individuals or of the demos to determine the course of their 
actions. If they are to succeed in regulating society for 
whatever ends the policy of the government dictates, their 
actions, decrees or laws must be promulgated only after care- 
ful study of the problems involved, and the social reactions 
which are likely to occur upon the enforcement of the pro- 
jected regulation or action. The observation of social reac- 
tions, and the prediction of the results to follow upon a pro- 
jected course of action, requires expert research by carefully 
organized departments which are now appearing in all types 
of governments. As the technique of observation and pre- 
diction develops, there will necessarily follow a narrowing 
of the field of what we now call policy determination; be- 
cause it is obviously bad policy to attempt the impossible. 
This ever-widening demand for governmental technicians is 
likely, in the long run, to develop into government by experts 
both in the fields of observation and in policy making. 
Under the circumstances it is not a far cry to the day when 
the postulates of the law will rest equally upon the observa- 
tion of a real, experimental social science developed under 
the guidance of experts. 
The Necessity for Action 
THIS FIELD OF HIGHLY PROFESSIONALIZED ACTIVITY, in the 
past, has belonged almost wholly to the lawyers, who, unfor- 
tunately, have used almost every device other than scientific 
method to solve the problems involved; but even so they 
have been forced by the very nature of their work to go fur- 
ther in the field than any other profession. It is no credit to 
the law schools that most of the progress has been achieved 
by groping in the dark. 
Either the law schools must revise their program to meet 
the requirements of the field of activity which their gradu- 
ates have preempted, or other schools must be created to train 
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the skilled government technicians of the future. The fact 
that we are late in starting simply intensifies our double- 
headed project, to create either within or outside of the law 
schools a new unified social science, and devise a means of 
using it as an instrument of social control through govern- 
ment and law. Since the law schools will be forced by the 
new requirements even of litigious practice to develop a large 
part of this field, they ought to undertake the entire task in 
cooperation with other departments of the educational insti- 
tutions. If the law schools are too blind, too conservative, 
too stupid, or too lazy to undertake the task, it should be 
started at once by independent institutions. 
